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E Pluribus Pluribus:
The Hijacking of the Voting Rights Act
and the Resegregation of America
INTRODUCTION

The Prussian Prince, Otto Von Bismarck, once remarked that "[i]f
you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one
being made."1 The same can be said of voting districts.2 Because of
the need to keep pace with population shifts, states are forced to
reapportion voting districts after each census. 3 Consequently, the
noisome process of accommodating the multifarious competing
interests that squeal to be recognized by reapportionment
committees descends upon the political landscape every ten years
much like a blight of locusts raining down upon a fertile field of
wheat.4 Each decision to recognize certain squeals while
subordinating others casts doubt upon our representative
democracy. The Department of Justice's baneful administration of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("Voting Rights Act" or "Act") is, a
fortiori, disturbing when one considers that it has forced
1. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM 15 (Bruce Nash & Allan Zullo eds., 1995).
2. The redistricting process has been described in many colorful ways. Perhaps the
best description was delivered by Pamela Karlan - "Redistricting, like reproduction,
combines lofty goals, deep passions about identity and instincts for self-preservation,
increasing reliance on technology, and often a need to 'pull [and] haul' rather indelicately at
the very end. And of course, it often involves somebody getting screwed." (alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted). Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: ReapportionmentAfter
the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L REV. 731, 733 (1998).
3. See id. at 735 (stating that "[plopulation shifts now require reapportionment of
virtually every legislative body after each decennial census. Self-preservation is a powerful
motivation for legislators to reapportion seats before the courts take the process out of their
hands.").
4. The clash of competing interest groups has placed the Democratic Party in a
particularly unenviable position. The formation of compact majority-black districts removes
many of the minority votes that liberal Democrats rely upon to get elected in mixed-race
districts. Fully cognizant of this fact, Democrats have attempted to design districts with
outrageous shapes to mitigate the effects of the creation of majority-black districts. See id. at
740-41 (remarking that "[bly posing the choice to the Democratic Party so starkly - the
majority non-white districts most likely to survive judicial scrutiny are configured in the way
most 'costly' to the Democratic Party - the wrongful districting decisions are likely to pit
black and white Democrats against each other, creating a three-way struggle for power in
the redistricting process.").
These efforts have given rise to many of the racially
gerrymandered districts that will be discussed at length herein.
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reapportionment committees to continually make concessions
based upon race even though neither the Voting Rights Act nor the
cases decided under it permit such discrimination. 5 Indeed,
Alexander Hamilton's remark in Federalist 9 concerning the
potential results of recognizing rigid distinctions between the
interests of each state applies equally well to the potential results
of recognizing rigid distinctions between the interests of each race
- "[W]e shall be driven to... splitting ourselves into an infinity of
little jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched
nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of
6
universal pity or contempt."
Although one may find it difficult to believe in the current
climate of incessant reapportionment litigation, there was a time
when courts refused to participate in disputes concerning the
characteristics of voting districts.7 This philosophy was drastically
altered, however, by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Baker v. Carr.s In holding that a dispute arising from an
imbalanced legislative apportionment scheme did not present a
nonjusticiable political question by the mere fact that political
rights were involved, the Court opened the Pandora's box of
redistricting controversies to the judicial branch. 9 Capitalizing on
5.

See discussion infra Parts I and II.

6.

THE FEDERALIST No. 5, at 52-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

7. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (concluding that a petition to
review the constitutionality of congressional districts was "beyond [the Court's] competence
to grant").
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. The Court held that "the mere fact that the suit seeks
protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question." Id. Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in his opinion in Colegrove, described a nonjusticiable political question as one
"of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet (sic) for judicial determination"
because of a "due regard for the effective working of our government." Colegrove, 328 U.S. at
552. Justice Frankfurter dissented from the majority opinion in Baker because he believed
the Court's entry into the political thicket threatened to eviscerate the respect of the people
for the judicial branch. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He supported his
position with the statement that:
The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements.
Id. One may argue in response, however, that even though prudence may dictate such
abstention, the Constitution, in fact, injects the Court into such imbroglios by demanding
that each citizen be provided with the equal protection of the law. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (forbidding the denial of the "equal protection of the laws" to any citizen).
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this new opportunity, the Court's decisions in Wesberry v. Sanders10
and Reynolds v. Sims' were laudable attempts to ensure that each
person's vote was of equal value. The abhorrent attempts of some
officials, especially in the South, to limit the access of certain
groups to the ballot box required more than the judiciary was able
to give, however. 2 Consequently, the Voting Rights Act of 196513
was passed to ensure that each person's opportunity to cast a vote
14
would not be denied.
This article will establish that the Supreme Court's initial efforts
in presiding over legislative apportionment disputes and the
language of the Voting Rights Act were constitutional attempts to
guarantee that each citizen has the opportunity to exercise one of
the rights most basic to being a free person - the right to vote. It
will also be established, however, that these efforts have been
hijacked by the Justice Department's recalcitrance in refusing to
administer the Voting Rights Act as written and interpreted by the
courts. Quite frankly, the Justice Department has transmogrifled
the Voting Rights Act into a document that demands the very thing
that the Act was designed to destroy - racial discrimination in the
voting process. 15 Part One will describe the administration of the
10. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Supreme Court in Wesberry held that that the "one person,
one vote" principle applies to congressional elections. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7. The "one
person, one vote" principle requires that each person's vote be of the same value as any
other person's; this principle is violated, for example, if one voting district contains 500,000
voters and another only contains 100,000 voters. See id.
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Supreme Court in Reynolds extended the "one person, one
vote" principle to state legislative districts. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. It is important to note,
for reasons that will hereinafter become apparent, that the Court in Reynolds recognized the
right to vote to be "individual and personal in nature." Id. at 561.
12. See infra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1994)).
14. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
15. A quite interesting comparison can be drawn between the passage of the Voting
Rights Act in 1965 and the Civil Rights Act in 1964 ("Civil Rights Act" or "Act"). The
proponents of the Voting Rights Act assured those who remained skeptical about the Act's
potential effects that it would, in no way, require race-conscious efforts to achieve
proportional representation of minority groups. See Charles Stephen Ralston & Michael A.
Carvin, Voting Rights Debate, 10 TouRo LAW REVIEW 415, 434 (1994). Likewise, the
proponents of the Civil Rights Act assuaged the concerns of many by explaining that no
racial quotas would result from passage of the Civil Rights Act. See id. at 434. In fact, one of
the chief promoters of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, stated in response
to a cautionary statement of a fellow senator that "if the senator can find ... any language
[in the bill] which provides that an employer will have to hire on the basis of percentage or
quota related to color, race, religion, or national origin, I will start eating the pages one after
another, because it is not in there." 110 Cong. Rec. 7420 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey). The history of both Acts, however, belies such statements as such effects have
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Voting Rights Act under the direction of the Justice Department. 16
Part Two will explain the significance of the change of course
mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Reno 7 and
its progeny. 8 Finally, Part Three will discuss why the holding in
Shaw v. Reno is correct, and why its only shortcoming is that its
language may not be explicit enough in establishing that race is no
more of a relevant difference between people than hair or eye
color.19

I.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT

A.

Voting Rights Before the Voting Rights Act

Soon after the Civil War, steps were taken by the federal
government to ensure that blacks in the South would not only be
free from bondage but would also be able to participate in the
political process. Foremost among these steps was the passage of
the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 guaranteeing that the right to
vote would not be denied on the basis of race or skin color.20 The
Enforcement Act of 1870 was also passed, which made interference
with the right to vote a criminal act.2' Such efforts had an
inimediate impact on voting rights as the number of blacks
registered to vote in the South rose rapidly.22 Consequently, blacks
were elected to political office in many southern states; for
instance, more than half of the legislators in the lower house of the
resulted directly from the administration of each of the Acts. See RALSTON, supra.
In defense of those who passed each Act, it must be pointed out that a sober reading of
the language of the Acts does not lead to the deleterious results referred to above. Such
results should be attributed to the cavalier fashion in which the administrative branches of
the federal government, including the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, have administered each of them. Quite frankly, after one examines
the way in which the Acts have been hijacked by those responsible for administering them,
one becomes very reticent to label as paranoid those who object to government involvement
in other areas such as the regulation of gun ownership.
16. *See infra Part I and accompanying notes.
17. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
18. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
19. See infra Part Ill and accompanying notes.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (demanding that "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
21. The Enforcement Act of 1870, Pub. L No. 41-114, 16 Stat. 140.
22. See DAVID MICHAEL HUDSON, ALONG RAcIAL LINES 15 (1998). Registration of black
voters increased even before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforcement
Act of 1870 as demonstrated by the fact that "[b]y 1867 there were 735,000 blacks and
635,000 whites on the voting rolls in the ten states of the Old South." Id.
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South Carolina legislature were black, and three blacks were
elected to the position of lieutenant governor.u
The history of voting rights prior to the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, especially in the South, would be no success story,
however. The political climate in the South changed after the
disputed presidential election of 1876.24 As a result of a
compromise, whereby the Democrats chose to support Rutherford
B. Hayes over Samuel Tilden in return for the end of close federal
supervision of the treatment of blacks in the South, the plight of
black voters soon became replete with barriers, some more
sophisticated than others, that blocked their exercise of the
franchise for over eighty years.25 For example, between 1896 and
1900 the number of blacks registered to vote in Louisiana

plummeted from 130,334 to

5320.26

B. The Passage of the Voting Rights Act
Even though the federal government "rediscovered" the problem
of voting rights in the South after World War II, the initial efforts
designed to secure such rights were futile.27 The passage of the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 16. The dispute was over which candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes or Samuel
Tilden, had received the most legitimate votes. Id. Due to the suspicion that supporters of
both candidates had altered the voting returns from the South, an electoral commission was
formed to investigate who had actually been elected. Id. Once the Democratic supporters of
Samuel Tilden recognized that their candidate had lost, they agreed to back Rutherford B.
Hayes if federal troops were removed from the South and Reconstruction effectively ended.
Id.
25. See id. at 17-18. Among the most common devices implemented to curb black
voting between the end of the Civil War and the passage of the Voting Rights Act were
English literacy tests and poll taxes (used as prerequisites to registration), the requirement
that one establish good character prior to voting (usually done by submitting references from
other registered voters), and Constitutional understanding tests. Id. at 5. Many of these fin
de siecle innovations were adopted in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-11
(1966). Perhaps the most prevalent was the literacy test requiring the ability to read and
write that was designed to exploit the difference in literacy rates between blacks and whites.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-11. To avoid isolating illiterate whites who were incapable of
passing such tests, different standards were used or help was given to them to ensure that
they would pass. Id. at 312. For example, a white applicant was given a passing evaluation in
Louisiana even though his written interpretation of a provision of the state constitution was
"FRDUM FOOF SPETGH." Id. at 313 (citing United States v. Louisiana, 225 ESupp. 353, 384
(E.D. La. 1963)). Perhaps the applicant meant "freedom of speech."
26. HUDSON, supra note 22, at 17.
27. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-14. This futility is reflected by the fact that the
registration of blacks in Alabama rose from 14.2% to only 19.4% between 1958 and 1964,
registration of blacks in Louisiana increased from 31.7% to only 31.896 between 1956 and
1965, and in Mississippi the registration of blacks rose from 4.4% to only 6.4% between 1954
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Civil Rights Acts of 1957,28 1960, 29 and 196430 kindled the hopes of
those who wished to extirpate the incidents of racial discrimination
in voting. 31 Suits brought under those Acts, however, were rarely
successful, certainly not on a state or region-wide basis, because
the rigors mandated by the Acts made preparing and establishing a
meritorious case an extremely laborious process; even if a state
practice was found to be a violation, the offending state was free
to, and often did, replace the offensive practice with different ones
32
that would require more suits ad infinitum.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., led the way for the passage of the
Voting Rights Act as he did for so many other salutary measures.3
His leadership prompted President Lyndon Johnson to demand that
Nicholas Katzenbach, the Attorney General, "write the god-damnest,
toughest voting rights act you can devise."34 The violence that
surrounded the civil rights movement in the South ensured that the
impetus for a voting rights act would not disappear.35 After
President Johnson proposed the Voting Rights Act to a joint session
of Congress by stating "we shall overcome," the Act was passed by
the House of Representatives by a 378 to 74 margin and by the
Senate by a 79 to 18 margin. 1
The Voting Rights Act was designed to secure the right to vote to
all citizens regardless of color and not to ensure any type of
proportional representation. 37 This is demonstrated by Attorney
and 1964. Id. at 313.
28. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (allowing, inter alia,
the Attorney General to request injunctions against efforts to restrict the right to vote on the
basis of race).
29. The Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (providing, inter alia,
the Attorney General with the power to examine voting records).
30. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (prohibiting, inter alia,
certain practices that prevented blacks from voting in federal elections).
31. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313.
32. Id. at 313-14.
33. HUDSON, supra note 22, at 54. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., actually met with
President Lyndon Johnson and outlined what he thought a voting rights act should contain.
Id. As Dr. King told President Johnson, a voting rights act was needed that "would provide
machinery that is virtually automatic to eliminate the interposition of varying standards and
crippling discretion on the part of hostile state officials . . . ." Id. In addition, Dr. King
pointed out that "[iut must apply to all elections - federal, state, or even for sheriff, school
board, etc." Id.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 54-55.
37. See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 465
(1997) (stating that "[iun 1965 the Voting Rights Act had a simple aim: to provide ballots for
southern blacks."). See also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308 (explaining that "[t]he Voting Rights
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General Katzenbach's statement during the congressional hearings
on the Act that its goal "is to increase the number of citizens who
can vote."3 Even though the Act as passed in 1965 contained
nineteen sections, an examination of the cases decided under it
would suggest that section 239 and section 540 are the only ones
because of the frequency that disputes under them have occurred
in comparison to the other sections.
• Section 2 prohibits the use of any voting practice or procedure
by any State or political subdivision that denies or abridges the
right of any citizen to vote on the basis of race or color or on the
41
basis that the citizen belongs to a language minority group.
Section 5, which applies only within certain covered jurisdictions,
demands that no change to a voting practice or procedure be
implemented without first "preclearing" it with either the Justice
Department or the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 42 Preclearance will result only if the applying state
convinces the Attorney General or the District Court through a
declaratory judgment action that the change does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on the basis of race or on the basis of membership in
a language minority group4
Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which
has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century").
38. THERNSTROM, supra note 37.
39. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). Section 2 now reads "[n]o
voting ... procedure shall be . . . applied by any state or political subdivision . . . which
results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race... or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2)...
Voting Rights Act § 2.
40. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994).
41. Voting Rights Act § 2. The language minorities covered by the Voting Rights Act are
Hispanics, Asian Americans, American Indians, and Alaskan natives. Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965, 28 C.FR. § 51.2 (1999). The
language minorities herein mentioned became covered groups when the Voting Rights Act
was amended in 1975. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400,
402.
42. Voting Rights Act § 5. There is no de minimis exception whereby minor alterations
need not be precleared. See 28 C.FR. § 51.12 (requiring that "[amny change affecting voting,
even though it appears to be minor or indirect, returns to a prior ... procedure, ostensibly
expands voting rights, or is designed to remove the elements that caused objection by the
Attorney General to a prior submitted change, must meet the Section 5 preclearance
requirement."). Jurisdictions become "covered" jurisdictions and, thus, subject to the
preclearance requirement, by exhibiting very low voter turnout or registration. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. at 317. See 28 C.FR. pt. 51 app. (setting forth the covered jurisdictions and the
dates when they became covered by section 5).
43. Voting Rights Act § 5. States resort to preclearance through the Attorney General
much more frequently than through the District Court because it is more convenient. See
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C. The Administration of the Voting Rights Act
The constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act was challenged
within a year of its passage. The State of South Carolina challenged
various sections of the Act, including section 5, by averring that
such legislation was not authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment."
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court rejected
South Carolina's claims and upheld the constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act. 45 The Court found that even though Congress
had been quite "inventive" when it drafted the Act, the Act was,
nevertheless, authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment. 46 According
to Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion, the goal of the Voting
Rights Act, which is to guarantee the right to vote for all citizens,
47
is firmly rooted within the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment. It
is interesting to note that questions concerning a group's putative
right to proportional representation were not considered, and were
certainly not resolved in the affirmative, by the Court's opinion.
The Voting Rights Act had a nearly immediate impact in favor of
increasing the access of black voters to the ballot box. 48 As the
supra note 37, at 468 (stating that "in very few instances have jurisdictions
actually chosen the option (built into the law) of going to the D.C. district court and then on
to the Supreme Court. The simpler, faster, less expensive alternative of administrative
preclearance (Justice Department review) has been the norm.").
44. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 316-17. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Virginia submitted amicus curiae briefs in support of South Carolina's claims; briefs in
opposition to South Carolina's claims were submitted by California, Illinois, and
Massachusetts (joined by Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). Id. at 307 & 308 n.2.
45. Id. at 327. South Carolina's most pointed charge was that Congress was not
empowered to enact specific remedies to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, but was,
instead, limited to crafting general prohibitions only. Id. The Court found no such "artificial
rule[]" within the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
46. Id. at 327-28. Such inventiveness was justified according to Chief Justice Warren's
majority opinion because the case-by-case litigation that had preceded the Voting Rights Act
placed too great a burden upon those who wished to end discrimination in voting. Id. at 328.
See supra text accompanying notes 27-32. The Court held that because litigation under
existing statutes was extremely onerous "Congress might well decide to shift the advantage
of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
328.
47. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. Chief Justice Warren optimistically remarked that the
Voting Rights Act may eventually lead to the point where "[wie may finally look forward to
the day when truly '(t)he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1).
Significantly, Chief Justice Warren said nothing about the proportional representation of
certain groups while pondering the possibilities of the Voting Rights Act.
48. See HUDSON, supra note 22, at 70 (listing the percentage of blacks registered to vote
THERNSTROM,
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number of blacks registered to vote and voting increased, however,
so did the appetites of those who wished to use the Voting Rights
Act for purposes beyond those for which it was passed.4 9 More
specifically, the Act became a vehicle for ensuring that certain
groups not only had equal voting rights, but also for ensuring that
representatives of certain ordained groups were actually elected. 50
Quite frankly, those who saw the American landscape as a
collection of groups rather than a nation of individuals were able to
successfully commandeer the Voting Rights Act, with the vital aid
of the Justice Department, for the objective of achieving the
election of people who looked or spoke similarly to each such
group.51 Regardless of the merits of proportional representation or
other communitarian notions, the use of the Voting Rights Act for
such purposes once its intended goal was met is a deplorable
example of the prestidigitation that the modem administrative state
makes possible.5 2 In short, those who favored the proportional
in various jurisdictions before and after the passage of the Voting Rights Act); see also
THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 463 (stating that "[tihe legislation quickly solved the problem
of black citizens unable to vote.").
49.

See CHRISTOPHER M. BURKE, THE APPEARANCE OF EQUALTY 65 (1999) (explaining that

"[t]he provisions of the VRA were transformed by voting rights litigants and activists, the
Justice Department, and the federal courts into a policy of race sorting in political
representation."); see also HUDSON, supra note 22, at 69 (remarking that "[t]he rapid and
resounding success of the act led civil rights leaders to posture their movement for greater
gains.").
50. See THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 464 (describing the expansion of the Act to
cover certain groups and pointing out the method by which success was redefined as failure
- "[p]rogress as initially conceived might be unmistakable, but redefined to ensure black
officeholding, it disappeared.").
51. BURKE, supra note 49, at 64. The Voting Rights Act, as administered and applied, is
not in tune with the holding of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), insofar as Reynolds
established the "one person, one vote" principle which elevates the individual rather than the
group to the position of prime importance. Id. In fact, it has been pointed out that:
It is astonishing how quickly and relatively uncontestedly the communal interpretation
of the VRA became the orthodox version. Communitarian rhetoric favored a
distribution of political power to racial and ethnic groups in proportion to their
numbers. This prescription of proportional entitlements profoundly altered the fabric
of American democracy. It refocused representation jurisprudence from the individual
to the group. The focus of equality broadened to include not only equality of
opportunity but also proportionality of result.
Id. (footnote omitted).
52. See supra note 15 (explaining how the administration of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 resulted in actions that were beyond the authority granted by the statute); see also
THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 466 (describing the difference between the Act as written and
as applied). The abominable application of the Voting Rights Act since its constitutionality as
written was upheld in Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301, has not gone completely unnoticed as
demonstrated by the following critique:
By 1975 those who enforced the Voting Rights Act had arrived at a point no one
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representation of groups should have sought a group rights statute
instead of attempting to implement their agenda under the guise of
the Voting Rights Act.
The factual background of the Supreme Court's decision in Beer
v. United States5 and its subsequent treatment by the Justice
Department are illustrative of the deficiencies in the administration
of the Voting Rights Act. Beer involved an attempt by the City of
New Orleans to obtain preclearance of its city council voting
districts under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.m The proposed
changes would have increased the number of districts in which
there was a majority of black inhabitants and black registered
voters. 55 Nevertheless, the Justice Department denied preclearance
because the proposed changes "diluted" black voting strength from
what was conceivable if different changes were made. 56 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, set
aside the refusal of preclearance by the Justice Department on the
basis that Section 5 only requires that changes, not be
57
retrogressive.
Ultimately, the Court found in Beer that the Voting Rights-Act
requires preclearance as long as the proposed changes do not
diminish the voting strength of a protected group.58 Even though
this holding clearly elevated the non-retrogression standard to the
envisioned in 1965. The right to vote no longer meant simply the right to enter a
polling booth and pull the lever. Yet the issue retained a simple Fifteenth Amendment
aura - one that was pure camouflage. An alleged voting rights violation had become a
districting plan that contained nine majority-black districts when a tenth could be
drawn.
THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 466.
53. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
54. Beer, 425 U.S. at 133-34.
55. Id. at 135-36.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 141-42. Justice Stewart explained the conclusion of the Court by stating that
"the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be
made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities." Id. at 141. See
also Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (stating that preclearance
should be given to a redistricting plan even if it is constructed with a discriminatory purpose
in mind if it is not retrogressive).
58. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141. The Court stated that "[ilt is ... apparent that a legislative
reapportionment that enhances the position of racial minorities . . . can hardly have the
'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of §
5." Id. As a related matter, the Court decided to include the remark that "[tihis Court has, of
course, rejected the proposition that members of a minority group have a federal right to be
represented in legislative bodies in proportion to their number in the general population." Id.
at 137. In addition, the Court trumpeted the goal of the Voting Rights Act - "to rid the
country of racial discrimination in voting." Id. at 140 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315).
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forefront of section 5 inquiries, the Justice Department has
proceeded as if the case was never decided in clear violation of its
59
obligations as the administrative arm of the Voting Rights Act.
Consequently, states and political subdivisions must continue to
defend their proposals against claims that preclearance should be
denied because black voting power is not maximized.60
The baneful administration of the Voting Rights Act is also
reflected by the Supreme Court's decision in United Jewish
Organizationsv. Carey.61 The dispute giving rise to United Jewish
Organizations began when the State of New York sought
preclearance of its revised voting districts for the state senate and
the state assembly. 62 Because of the need to pacify the Justice
Department by wringing out as many majority-minority districts as
possible, the redistricting committee decided to split the Hasidic
Jewish community in and around the Williamsburgh area into two
different districts.6 Representatives of the Hasidic Jews filed suit
based upon the claim that the decision to decrease their voting
strength to augment the voting power of other minorities violated
their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.64
Justice White, in his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,
rejected the claim of the Hasidic Jewish community as he
explained that such discrimination in favor of certain minority
groups and at the expense of others is authorized by the Voting
59. See THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 469-70 (describing the saga giving rise to the
Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), that was highlighted by
the Justice Department's demand that black voting strength be maximized for preclearance
to occur); see also Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 28 C.FR. § 51.56 (1999) (stating that "the Attorney General will be guided by the
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of other Federal courts.").
This provision, which requires that the decisions of the federal courts be obeyed, would
appear tautological in most circumstances but certainly not so as it relates to the defiance of
the Justice Department.
60. See THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 471 (stating that "the contempt with which the
Justice Department viewed the Court's interpretation of the law was startling ....
If three
majority-black districts could be drawn, then only a plan that contained all three should be
considered racially 'fair.'").
61. 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion).
62. United Jewish Organizations,430 U.S. at 148-52.
63. Id. at 152. The Justice Department had objected to the first proposed changes that
were submitted because they did not carve out sufficiently large nonwhite majorities. Id. One
of the reapportionment committee members justified the decision to bifurcate the Jewish
community by explaining that the Justice Department was essentially demanding that the
population of the district in which the Jewish community was previously entirely contained
be at least 65% nonwhite. Id.
64. Id. at 152-53.
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Rights Act.65
United Jewish Organizations provides a clear yet grotesque
description of how the Voting Rights Act has been used to favor
certain groups while ignoring others. The desultory fashion in
which groups like Asian Americans and Alaskan natives have
become protected groups while certain religious groups and even
women have been left out has besmirched the entire Act. 66 Indeed,
a group's presence on the protected list reveals that group's current
political clout and calls into question that group's justification for
being on the list at all.67 In any event, the playing of favorites and
the subsequent clash of minority groups are inevitable outgrowths
of a policy aimed at ensuring the election of members of certain
groups at the expense of others.6 Because the election process is,
by its very nature, a zero-sum game while the voting process is not,
the only way to apply the Voting Rights Act in a neutral and fair
manner is to confine its administration to guaranteeing that
everyone has access to the voting booth.69
The United States Supreme Court further muddied the Voting
Rights Act waters with its decision in Thornburg v. Gingles. 0
Unlike Beer and United Jewish Organizations, Gingles dealt with
71
a claim of vote dilution under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
The section 2 claim was facilitated by the 1982 amendments to the
Act that made it possible to establish a section 2 vote dilution
violation even if the challenged voting practice or procedure was
implemented without the intent of denying or abridging the right of
65. Id. at 165.
66. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402
(including Hispanics, Asian Americans, American Indians, and Alaskan natives as protected
groups); see also Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 28 C.YR. § 51.2 (1999) (listing the groups to be considered in determining whether a
voting change should be precleared); see also note 41 and accompanying text.
67. See BURKE, supra note 49, at 65-66 (explaining how the powerful lobbying presence
of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund overcame the opposition of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to achieve protected status
under the Voting Rights Act).
68. See HUDSON, supra note 22, at 109 (identifying black opposition as one of the major
obstacles to hispanics becoming a protected group and explaining that such opposition was
a result of the fears of many blacks that expansion to cover other groups would limit black
advantages gained from the administration of the Act).
69. This recommendation is bolstered by the fact that the Voting Rights Act was
designed to secure the right to vote and was not written or intended to ensure the election
of anyone.
70. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
71. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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anyone to vote. 72 The Gingles Court held that various state
legislative districts in North Carolina had the impermissible result
of diluting the voting power of blacks living within those districts.73
In so doing, the Court listed the three Gingles factors for
establishing a section 2 vote dilution claim - (1) the objecting
minority group must be sufficiently large and compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member district, (2) the minority group must
be politically cohesive, and (3) the white majority must vote as a
bloc such that it is able to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.1
Even though section 2, as amended in 1982, expressly denies that
it requires that certain minority groups be proportionally
represented, the Gingles decision is an accurate indication of the
effect section 2 now has on the push for proportional
representation. 75 A fortiori, section 2 has a more widespread
influence than section 5 because section 2 applies to all
jurisdictions, not just covered ones, and an existing practice may
constitute a violation whereas only changes to voting practices
activate section 5.76 In short, section 2 allows disgruntled voters to
"police" the election landscape anywhere, anytime, as long as the
current voting system has failed to result in the proportional
representation of certain groups. 77
72. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. Prior
to the 1982 amendment to section 2, no violation of section 2 could be established even if
the apparent result of a voting procedure was to dilute a particular group's potential voting
strength unless it was shown that such a result was intended. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980) (requiring a discriminatory purpose to accompany a discriminatory result for a
section 2 violation to be found).
73. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
74. Id. at 49-51.
75. Section 2 requires that claims of vote dilution be evaluated according to "the
totality of circumstances," but allows "[tihe extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision" to be one of the
circumstances taken account of. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
Section 2 also contains the disclaimer "[t]hat nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." Voting Rights Act § 2. Despite this carefully worded language, achieving
proportional representation of certain groups appears to be the only safe way to guard
against section 2 problems.
76. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text; see also BURKE, supra note 49, at 76
(stating that the 1982 amendments "extended Section 5-type protections to all jurisdictions
with significant minority populations").
. 77. See BURKE, supra note 49, at 78 (remarking that "[tihe right not to have one's racial
voice submerged, found in Section 2 of the VRA, became the right to be represented
separately, distinctly, and proportionately by race."). Justice O'Connor realized the disparity
between the words of section 2 and the manner in which it is administered:
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT

A. Shaw v. Reno: A Dramatic Change of Course
The administration of the Voting Rights Act was rarely challenged
on constitutional grounds until the Supreme Court's decision in
Shaw v. Reno.75 With few exceptions, such as in Katzenbach and
United Jewish Organizations, disputes concerning the Voting
Rights Act were based upon the interpretation of the Act, as
opposed to direct constitutional challenges to the manner in which
the Act was being applied. 9 This lack of constitutional challenges
can largely be explained by the uncertainty surrounding the
question of whether members of the majority group, that is to say
whites, could state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of racial gerrymandering
designed to promote minority voting strength.80 In Shaw v. Reno,
the Supreme Court found that a citizen of a racially gerrymandered
district could state a cognizable claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment if traditional districting principles, such as respect for
political subdivisions, compactness, and contiguity, were sacrificed
in favor of racial concerns.8 '
Surely Congress did not intend to say on the one hand, that members of a protected
class have no right to proportional representation, and on the other, that any
consistent failure to achieve proportional representation, without more, violates § 2. A
requirement that minority representation usually be proportional to the minority
group's proportion in the population is not quite the same as a right to strict
proportional representation, but it comes so close to such a right as to be inconsistent
with § 2's disclaimer and with the results test that is codified in § 2.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 96 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). The significance of the constitutional challenge found in Shaw
v. Reno has been described as follows:
[T]he constitutionality of the VRA as amended in 1975 and 1982 was not seriously
questioned until Shaw in 1993. Of course, South Carolina v. Katzenbach considered
the constitutionality of the VRA of 1965 soon after its passage and answered in the
affirmative, but the VRA that Katzenbach considered had changed radically by 1982.
Prior to Shaw, the federal courts articulated an underlying communitarian purpose in
the VRA, and acted only to clarify its limits when presented with novel fact situations
BuRKE, supra note 49, at 88 (footnote omitted).
79. BURKE, supra note 49, at 88.
80. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 677-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding no violation if the
majority group is being disadvantaged for the benefit of a minority group). The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state to "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONs'r. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649. Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion of the Court, stated
the Court's decision this way:
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause
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633

The factual background of the Shaw v. Reno decision was
highlighted by North Carolina's attempt to obtain preclearance from
the Justice Department of its congressional districts.8 2 The need for
preclearance arose when it was determined that North Carolina's
83
increased population entitled it to an additional seat in Congress.
The initial districting proposal that was submitted contained only
one majority-black district; consequently, the Justice Department
denied preclearance because a second majority-black district was
possible.84 In response to the objection of the Justice Department,
North Carolina submitted a new plan that contained two
majority-black districts with very unusual shapes.8 5 In fact, one of
the districts resembled a "bug splattered on a windshield"ss while
the other district was so narrow and followed the Interstate 85
corridor so closely that "if you drove down the interstate with both
car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district. "87
Nevertheless, the new proposal gained Justice Department
approval. 88 The plan was challenged by five citizens of Durham
County, North Carolina, who, as a result of the narrow Interstate
85 district, were segregated into two different voting districts
despite their close proximity to one another.8 9
may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face,
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters
into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.
Id.
82. Id. at 634-35.
83. Id. at 633.
84. Id. at 634-35. But cf. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976) (finding that
preclearance under section 5 should only be denied when the proposed change will have a
retrogressive effect on the ability of minorities to vote regardless of the room available for
the augmentation of minority voting power).
85. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 635-36.
86. Id. at 635 (quoting the WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14). The "bug splat" district
was District 1. Id. It was "hook shaped" and was "[clentered in the northeast portion of the
state, it move[d] southward until it taperfed] to a narrow band; then, with finger-like
extensions, it reach[ed] far into the southern-most part of the State near the South Carolina
border." Id.
87. Id. at 635-36 (quoting the WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4). The "Interstate
85" district was District 12. Id. at 635. District 12 was "approximately 160 miles long and, for
much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor." Id. It was "snakelike" and included
"tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas." Id. "At one point the district
remain[ed] contiguous only because it intersect[ed] at a single point with two other districts
before crossing over them." Id. at 636.
88. Id. at 636.
89. Id. at 636-37. Of the five North Carolina residents who challenged the revised plan,
two were grouped into District 12 and three were grouped into District 2. Id. at 637. Their
claim did not mention their skin color. Id. at 641. Rather, their challenge to the voting
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In arriving at the conclusion that a member of a majority group
could state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of
a racially gerrymandered districting plan, Justice O'Connor, in her
opinion for the Court, compared the policy of requiring racial
gerrymandering to achieve preclearance to "political apartheid" and
refused to accept Justice Stevens's argument in dissent that no
constitutional violation arises if only members of the majority
group are disadvantaged because of their skin color.90 It must be
pointed out that Justice O'Connor's majority opinion did not
establish that racial motivations in districting decisions are always
impermissible. 91 The Court did hold, however, that traditional
districting principles, including respect for political subdivisions,
compactness, and contiguity, must never be subordinated to racial
concerns unless the predominant use of race is narrowly tailored to
a compelling government interest. 92 In addition, the Court found
that appearance does matter to the extent that the existence of
grotesquely shaped districts can establish the predominance of
districts was based upon the assertion that the racially gerrymandered districts denied to
them their right to take part "in a 'color-blind' electoral process." Id. at 641-42.
90. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. The Court's opinion stated that:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the
same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of
their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group - regardless of their age,
education, economic status, or the community in which they live - think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have
rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.
Id.
91. Id. at 642.
92. Id. at 647, 658. It is important to note that the Court did not espouse the idea that
the Constitution requires that any traditional districting principles be followed. Id. at 647.
Rather, the Court held that such principles are important factors because their non-existence
within a districting plan is very strong evidence that race was the predominant factor in the
districting process. Id.
The Court justified its requirement that racial gerrymanders be subjected to strict scrutiny
while political gerrymanders often are not with the following passage:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They
reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals
should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with respect to
voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering even for remedial purposes
may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters - a goal that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody and to which the Nation continues to
aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures
demands close judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 657.
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racial motivations. 93
B. Miller v. Johnson and Bush v. Vera: Additional Constraintson
a Runaway Justice Department
The ability of citizens of racially gerrymandered districts to bring
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was augmented by the Supreme Court's decision in
Miller v. Johnson 4 Coming on the heels of Shaw v. Reno, the
Court in Miller was asked to determine whether such a claim could
be made based upon evidence other than the presence of bizarrely
shaped districts.9 5 To be sure, the claim of racial gerrymandering in
Miller was certainly buoyed by the nonsensical shapes of the
congressional districts submitted for preclearance by the State of
Georgia 9 6 Nevertheless, the incessant efforts of the Justice
Department in coercing Georgia to discriminate on the basis of
race for the purpose of squeezing out a third majority-black
congressional district when two were initially proposed and only
one had previously existed, in clear violation of the
non-retrogression principle propounded in Beer, provided ample
support for the claim that racial motivations predominated in the
97
districting process.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, ruled that
the presence of a bizarre shape is not a sine qua non of a claim of
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering in redistricting. 9 While the
Court affirmed the holding in Shaw v. Reno, insofar as that holding
established that the predominance of racial concerns could be
demonstrated by the circumstantial evidence of a district's shape,
the Miller opinion enlarged the available pool of evidence by
finding that other evidence, such as the demands made by the
Justice Department, could support a charge of racial
93. Id. at 647. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion stated that "we believe that
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter." Id.
94. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
95. Mil/er, 515 U.S. at 910-11.
96. Id. at 907-09 (explaining that the three majority-black districts arising from the
"max-black" plan espoused by the Justice Department included "the narrowest of land
bridges," ruptured counties, and long tracts wherein urban and rural neighborhoods were
linked together in districts spanning over 260 miles in length).
97. See id. at 907-08 (quoting the lower court, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 1994),
that remarked that the districting plan "bore all the signs of [the Justice Department's]
involvement") (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 912-13.
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the Miller Court reinforced

the

principle that districts constructed with racial concerns serving as

the districting committee's lodestar may only be enacted if they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.' °° In
addition, the Miller decision concluded that the maximization of
majority-black districts is not a compelling government interest
when the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted in Beer, only requires
that there be no retrogression in the ability of blacks to vote. 10 1
The Supreme Court chased its decisions in Shaw v. Reno and
Miller with its decision in Bush v. Vera.10 2 Under scrutiny in Bush

were the congressional districts constructed by Texas and
precleared by the Justice Department after the 1990 census. 1' 3 More
99. Id. at 913. Justice Kennedy's opinion stated that:
Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional
wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles,
was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.
The logical implication, as courts applying Shaw have recognized, is that. parties may
rely on evidence other than bizarreness to establish race-based districting.
Id.
100. Id. at 904, 916.
101. Mi/!er, 515 U.S. at 921-22. The Court stated its position in the following manner:
[C]ompliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting
where the challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional
reading and application of those laws.
. . . The District Court found that the Justice Department had adopted a
"black-maximization" plan under § 5, and that it was clear from its objection letters
that the Department would not grant preclearance until the State . . . created a third
majority-black district . . . . It is, therefore, safe to say that the congressional plan
enacted in the end was required in order to obtain preclearance. It does not follow,
however, that the plan was required by the substantive provisions of the Act.
Id. at 921 (citations omitted). The Court articulated its final conclusion as follows: "It takes a
shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting Rights Act to invoke that statute, which
has played a decisive role in redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to
demand the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids." Id. at 927-28.
One cannot overstate the degree of involvement of the Justice Department in the drawing
of the congressional districts reviewed in Miller. In fact, the Justice Department teamed up
with the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and adopted the ACLU's "max-black" plan
to coerce Georgia into making as many majority-black districts as possible regardless of
shape or shared interests. THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 470. In addition, the Justice
Department's preoccupation with the racial makeup of proposed districts cannot be gainsaid.
For instance, in drafting South Carolina's election districts, a Justice Department attorney
actually labeled each district either "B" or "W," although he supposedly could not remember
what the letters stood for at a subsequent trial. Id. at 480.
102. 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion).
103. Bush, 517 U.S. at 956-57. The redistricting plan was precleared, in large part,
because of the creation of three majority-minority districts - District 30 (majority-black
population), District 29 (majority-hispanic population), and District 18 (majority-black
population). Id.
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significant for its bolstering of conclusions already reached than for
any novel finding, the Bush decision served to highlight those
redistricting principles that had been firmly established in prior
cases.°4 In addition, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court reveals those issues in
redistricting controversies that remain unsettled and may very well
become important in the next round of redistricting litigation after
°5
the results of the 2000 census are tallied.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion determined that three of the
Texas congressional districts were unconstitutional because they
were constructed with race predominating over other districting
principles, and because the implementation of racial classifications
was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. 106
Of particular importance was the fact that a computer software
program called "REDAPPL" was utilized in the redistricting process
that allowed racial data to be analyzed on a block-by-block basis as
districts were drawn.'0 7 Along with the unusual shapes of the
majority-black and majority-hispanic districts, such evidence of the
use of racial demographics was sufficient to support a conclusion
of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. 0 8
As stated above, however, the judgment of the Court highlighted
not only the settled principles of redistricting litigation, but also
those issues that are not settled. °9 In particular, Justice O'Connor's
104. Id. at 958-59 (echoing the principles settled previously in Shaw v. Reno and
Mi//er).
105. See id. at 958 (stating that districts created with the intent of aggregating a
majority-minority population or with race in mind are not necessarily strictly scrutinized).
But see id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., concurring) (demanding that all classifications using race as
a guide be strictly scrutinized).
106. Id. at 957.
107. Id. at 961-62. The Court made note of the fact that:
The primary tool used in drawing district lines was a computer program called
"REDAPPL" REDAPPL permitted redistricters to manipulate district lines on
computer maps, on which racial and other socioeconomic data were superimposed. At
each change in configuration of the district lines being drafted, REDAPPL displayed
updated racial composition statistics for the district as drawn. REDAPPL contained
racial data at the block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party registration
and past voting statistics, were only available at the level of voter tabulation districts
(which approximate election precincts). The availability and use of block-by-block
racial data was unprecedented; before the 1990 census, data were not broken down
beyond the census tract level . . . . By providing uniquely detailed racial data,
REDAPPL enabled districters to make more intricate refinements on the basis of race
than on the basis of other demographic information.
Id. at 961-62 (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 962, 973-74.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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conclusion in her plurality opinion that the intentional use of race
in drawing districts and the intentional creation of
majority-minority districts may not always trigger strict scrutiny if
race is not the predominant consideration leaves unanswered the
question of how far states may go in seeking to augment the voting
power of certain groups before the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated. 110 Juxtaposed with Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
which he expressed his conclusion that all governmental
classifications based upon race should be strictly scrutinized, the
judgment of the Court in Bush fails to provide a definitive
pronouncement that racial gerrymandering in redistricting cannot
be countenanced under our constitutional regime."' Unless
Congress makes the unlikely choice to intervene, such a ruling may
ultimately be necessary to compel the Justice Department to
administer the Voting Rights Act as written and as the Constitution
demands. 112
III. WHY SHAW v. RENO Was Right: A Defense of Color Blindness
A. The ConstitutionalInjury Caused by Racial Gerrymandering
Justice Stevens dissented in both Bush and Miller.1 3 At the heart
of each of his dissenting opinions in those two cases is his
110. Bush, 517 U.S. at 958.
111. Id. at 999-1000 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas's opinion stated that
"application of strict scrutiny in this suit was never a close question. I cannot agree with
Justice O'Connor's assertion that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the intentional creation of
majority-minority districts." Id. at 999. Justice Thomas went on to explain that:
Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race, and we
While
have expressly held that there is no exception for race-based redistricting ....
we have recognized the evidentiary difficulty of proving that a redistricting plan is, in
fact, a racial gerrymander, . . . we have never suggested that a racial gerrymander is
subject to anything less than strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1000 (Citations omitted).
112. Congress is unlikely to act for at least two reasons: (1) because of the politically
explosive nature of race-conscious redistricting, and (2) because the language of the Voting
Rights Act is not the source of the problem; rather, the problem arises from the
interpretation and application of the Act. In any event, a definitive statement about the
unconstitutionality of discriminating on the basis of race in the redistricting process is
necessary because, as the cases discussed herein reveal, the Justice Department has shown a
maddening ability "to be given an inch, but to take a foot."
113. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting to the judgment of
the Court that found, in part, that political gerrymandering in favor of a minority group may
cause constitutional harm to majority group members); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 929
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting, inter alia, because the opinion of the Court recognized
that a majority group member is injured by being included within a racially gerrymandered
voting district).
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assertion that members of the majority group, that is to say whites,
suffer no injury when voting districts are politically gerrymandered
to favor certain minority groups.'1 4 If such a position is
constitutionally viable, then no Shaw v. Reno claim could be made
because the lack of an injury would prevent any majority group
member from challenging racial gerrymandering in redistricting.
Justice Stevens's position, however, is unjustifiable. 115
The injury that Justice Stevens failed to identify is the injury that
any American citizen suffers when treated differently from others
because of race. 1' 6 The Equal Protection Clause demands that no
one be discriminated against on account of race. 1 7 This guarantee
114. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[r]acial
gerrymandering of the sort being addressed in these cases is 'discrimination' only in the
sense that the lines are drawn based on race, not in the sense that harm is imposed on
specific persons on account of their race."); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 932 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that "I do not see how a districting plan that favors a politically weak
group can violate equal protection.").
115. See discussion infra Part I!I.A-D.
116. See Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995) (stating that
"whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution[]."). One may find Justice Stevens's inability to perceive a constitutional injury
suffered by whites when they are racially gerrymandered into majority-minority districts
peculiar after one considers his dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) (plurality opinion). In Fullilove, Justice Stevens objected to the Court's decision to
uphold a set-aside program granting racial preferences to minority construction companies.
The gravamen of his dissent is the following passage:
[E]ven though it is not the actual predicate for this legislation, a statute of this kind
inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are
granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified
purely by their race. Because that perception - especially when fostered by the
Congress of the United States - can only exacerbate rather than reduce racial
prejudice, it will delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least
insignificant, factor.
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Of particular interest is Justice
Stevens's remark that programs that create racial consciousness are objectionable because
they hinder efforts aimed at making race irrelevant in American society. Id. Certainly the
segregation of whites and blacks into separate and distinct voting districts by the mandate of
the Justice Department is an instance of official government action based upon race that
Justice Stevens at one time found objectionable.
117. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (identifying the elimination of
discrimination on the basis of race from all governmental actions as a goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment). One of the most lucent descriptions of the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment was articulated in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
289-90 (1978) (plurality opinion). In Bakke, the Court stated that:
The Guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is
explicit: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." It is settled beyond question that the "rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights." The guarantee of equal
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extends to all citizens; the fact that an individual is white and,
therefore, is considered to be a majority group member does not,
ipso facto, mean that the right not to be discriminated against
because of race is waived. 18 Furthermore, the definition of
"discrimination" does not encompass only those actions that harm
the political, social, or economic interests of a particular person or
group. To the contrary, to discriminate against someone one need
only "distinguish" or "differentiate" one person from another." 9
Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause provides an unfortunate
twist for racial gerrymanderers in that they may not make
distinctions among citizens on the basis of race regardless of the
skin color of the group to be benefited or burdened.
We should be glad that the Constitution forbids racial
discrimination even by those with benign yet myopic intentions. 120
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same
protection, then it is not equal.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1,
and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
118. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (stating that "[olne must be ever
aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of
discrimination.'") (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)). The enjoyment of the
rights protected by the Constitution simply does not depend upon whether the group seeking
to exercise such a right currently outnumbers another group. One can easily imagine the
chaos that would result from such a philosophy.
119. See THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 220 (1989) (defining "discriminate" as
"distinguish, differentiate"). Even if "discrimination" in the context of racial gerrymandering
requires that a particular person or group lose political power, there would still be a
constitutional injury to support Shaw v. Reno claims. The Supreme Court's decision in
Powers, 499 U.S. at 400 (1991), illustrates this point. In Powers, the Court held, inter alia,
that a white person may object to the race-based use of peremptory challenges to remove
black potential jurors from the venire. Id. at 402. The injury complained of in Powers was
ostensibly one incurred by the black potential jurors yet the white defendant's claim was
recognized. Id. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
When one directs the rationale supporting the Powers decision toward Shaw v. Reno
claims, it appears that a white voter could assert a cognizable claim not only on behalf of
himself if he resides in a racially gerrymandered district, but also on behalf of black voters.
The white voter could make a cognizable claim, a fortiori, by identifying the black voters
who were left behind by the racial gerrymanderers and now live in districts that are
overwhelmingly majority white wherein they may have less influence according to those
inclined to think in racial terms.
120. One such proponent of attempting to achieve proportional representation through
racial gerrymandering is Lani Guinier. It is Guinier's belief that those who vote for the losing
candidate in elections, in effect, "waste" their votes because the votes were not directed
toward a candidate who gained political office. Lani Gunier, Groups, Representation, and
Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, in

AFFmMATIVE ACTION AND

REPRESENTATION 223, 227 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997). According to Guinier, a voting
system does not function properly if a voter "is represented by the person against whom he
or she votes" because "the representation of the majority of the people becomes a
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The segregation of voters according to race erects a nearly
insuperable impediment to the glimmering goal of erasing racial
discrimination from the American landscape. At the heart of
attempts to racially gerrymander voting districts is the notion that
members of certain minority groups cannot be represented by
non-members because the interests of such non-members are
hostile to the interests of these minority groups.1 21 At the very least,
representation of the whole people." Id. at 250. This critique misapprehends the nature of
how a representative democracy works, and her solution to the "problem," which is to give
everyone an equal opportunity to vote for a winning candidate, calls to mind an advertising
slogan - "Tastes great, less filling." Id. at 228-29.
To be represented simply does not mean that one voted for the representative; all that is
necessary is that one have had the opportunity to cast an equally-weighted vote in the
election. Furthermore, groups that are not large enough to elect their preferred candidates
on their own, and arguably none are, may still gain political success by aligning themselves
with other groups. Because most elections are won by very narrow margins, no candidate
can afford to ignore the demands of any group, even those with disparate political views
from his own. Guiniers's primary suggestion, which is that everyone be given an opportunity
to vote for a winning candidate, is seriously weakened by the fact that there are an infinite
number of groups in our society, not just racial ones, and by the fact that, in a democracy,
math counts and some candidate has to lose. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (stating that "the
democratic ideals of equality and majority rule, which have served this Nation so well in the
past, are hardly of any less significance for the present and the future."); see also United
Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (finding that an "individual voter. . . has no
constitutional complaint merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and his
district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote. Some candidate, along with his
supporters, always loses.").
121. This assertion is supported by a string of cases decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealing with the evidentiary value of minority
electoral success in vote dilution controversies under the Voting Rights Act. For instance, in
Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F2d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990), the election of a
black candidate was discounted to make way for a section 2 vote dilution claim because,
even though a black candidate was successful, it was not established that the particular
black candidate was the true choice of black voters instead of merely being black voters'
preferred choice over white candidates. Meek, along with the other cases in the series
referenced infra, suggest that not only must black candidates win elections to meet the
requirements of the polluted version of the Voting Rights Act that is now often applied, but
they must also be elected by other blacks.
See NAACP v. Gadsden County Sch. Bd., 691 F2d 978, 983 (11th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
allow the election of a black candidate to disprove the dilution of black voting strength
because the candidate may have been elected merely "to thwart" a vote dilution challenge
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); see also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F2d 1546, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that minority electoral success may be
ignored because it may have been motivated by the desire to avoid section 2 vote dilution
liability and also deciding that the degree to which white representatives are responsive to
minority needs has no influence in section 2 vote dilution litigation); see also Solomon v.
Liberty County Comm'rs, 166 F3d 1135, 1145 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the mere fact that
a black candidate was elected was not enough to prove that black voting strength was not
diluted because the Voting Rights Act requires that a black candidate be shown to have been
the candidate of choice of black voters), vacated, 206 E3d 1054, 1055 (11th Cir. 2000); see
also THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 490 (remarking that white support for black candidates,

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 39:619

such thinking threatens our nation's prosperity because it paints a
picture of American society as nothing more than a collection of
hostile factions that are incapable of living together unless the
government allocates to each caviling group a piece of political
power.122
Racial gerrymandering is a particularly subversive practice
because it not only guarantees that race will always be a point of
division among American citizens, but because it will ultimately
prove futile in advancing the interests of the very minorities who
are its putative beneficiaries.'?- This futility is certainly guaranteed
124
if the premise upon which racial gerrymandering is based is true.
That is to say that if minorities need to be segregated into separate
and distinct districts to ensure their representation because the
antagonism of whites toward protected minorities precludes whites
from genuinely representing such minorities, then such minority
representation will ultimately prove vacuous because the
underlying white antagonism will follow the minority
representatives to the legislatures and prevent any salutary
measures from being passed in favor of minority interests. 125 In
effect, the net result of racial gerrymandering would be an
increased volume of comments of minority congressmen in the
such as for Douglas Wilder in the Virginia gubernatorial election, is brushed off as
"aberrational").
122. See THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 490-92 (stating that racial classifications "imply
that individuals are defined by blood - not by character, social class, religious sentiments,
age, or education. But categories appropriate to a caste system are a poor basis on which to
build that community of equal citizens upon which democratic government depends.").
123. Officially assigning the representation of minority interests to a small number of
minority representatives, which would be the result of achieving strict proportional
representation through racial gerrymandering, would be dangerous to minorities. It would
ensure that those representatives who are concerned with certain minority interests would
be far outnumbered by the rest of the legislators who would represent much larger
percentages of white voters as a result of the segregation through racial gerrymandering.
This situation would be similar to the situation that would have resulted if the British would
have reacted to the cries of "no taxation without representation" by granting the American
colonies proportional representation in the British Parliament. That is to say that the
colonists would then have been represented, but would still have been unable to effectively
prevent or control their rate of taxation because their portion of representatives in
Parliament would have been so meager. See JOHN PHiuP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 2-3 (1989) (remarking that "to give Americans
representation in the British parliament 'would [have] ... tak[en] away from the colonists
the grand bulwark of their liberties.'") (citing an anonymous constitutional commentator).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
125. See Burke, supra note 49, at 78-79 (stating that "white representatives from
majority-white districts will have little incentive to discuss race issues with minority
representatives from majority-minority districts if they do not need minority votes to remain
in office. Majority-minority districting may resegregate the legislature.").
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Congressional Record but no increase in governmental efforts to
cure the problems afflicting minority communities. In addition,
congressional sessions would take on the appearance of summits
between nations wherein the participants come to further their own
interests with little or no concern for the interests of opposing
parties. The interests of majority and minority group members are
not, of course, so diametrically opposed; but the moment one
begins to embrace this proposition, the justification for racial
1 26
gerrymandering begins to disintegrate.
B. The ConstitutionRecognizes Individuals Not Interests
In Gray v. Sanders,2 7 the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he
concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no

preferred class of voters." 28 As this statement demonstrates, the
Constitution only "sees" individuals; it does not seek to protect or
exalt any particular group or groups. 129 Certainly attempts to

officially recognize particular group interests by allocating power in
proportionate amounts are as unavailing as they are unjust because
of the sheer number of potentially recognizable interests and
because of the fact that many interests can be possessed by the
same person at the same time. 30 Yet the Voting Rights Act has been
126. The ultimate extension of the philosophy behind racial gerrymandering forces its
proponents to either espouse the position that white and minority interests are permanently
at odds, in which case nothing is really gained by electing minority candidates because they
would meet with failure in legislatures, or to accept that white and-minority interests do not
wholly oppose each other, in which case the necessity of segregating minorities into
majority-minority districts disappears.
127. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
128. Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-80 (quoting U.S. CONST. preamble).
129. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (stating that "[liegislators represent people, not trees
or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.").
130. The arbitrary nature of the manner in which only five minorities have become
protected under the Voting Rights Act becomes apparent when one realizes that two
interests that have been among the most frequent sources of discrimination historically, that
is to say gender and religion, are not on the protected list under the Voting Rights Act. See
HUDSON, supra note 22, at 13 (describing the plight of female voters in America until their
right to vote was established by constitutional amendment); see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (inquiring why distinctions based upon race are
acceptable while distinctions based upon religion are not attempted). Perhaps religious or
gender gerrymandering would be considered were it not for the fact that any attempt to
segregate voters according to religion or gender would create a logistical nightmare that no
computer software could sort out. In addition, just as the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), expressed its horror at the thought of police officers invading
the marital bedroom searching for contraceptives, certainly the intrusion of the redistricter's
line-drawing pen between man and wife would be "repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
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administered as if the Constitution allows discrimination on the
basis of race as long as such discrimination is designed to achieve
the proportional representation of the five selected minority
interests.
The entrenchment of property interests was initially attempted in
many states after independence from Britain was achieved. 13 1 At the
heart of these attempts were property ownership and tax payment
requirements as prerequisites to voting.132 Such efforts were
eventually abandoned, however, in favor of the belief that "politics.
. . was not the reconciling but the transcending of the different
interests of the society in the search for the single common
good."'3 The fact that the representation of certain vulnerable
interests was pondered but ultimately jettisoned long before the
passage of the Voting Rights Act by the same generation that
drafted the Constitution is strong evidence of the individualized
134
nature of representation in our constitutional democracy.
The abject futility of attempting to divide American society
according to various arbitrary characteristics for the purpose of
proportionally representing certain interests was actually perceived
before the commencement of the Justice Department's race-sorting
efforts under the Voting Rights Act. In fact, Alexander Hamilton, in
Federalist 35, severely castigated those who sought to obstruct the
adoption of the Constitution by claiming that the legislative branch,
as structured by the Constitution, was deficient because it would
not allow for the representation of each interest that was present
in American society at the time. 135 Hamilton, in his typically
perspicuous fashion, attacked such complaints by stating:
131. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBuC 218-19 (1969)
(stating that property "was becoming an interest in its own right, to be specially represented
in the legislature").
132. See HUDSON, supra note 22, at 10-11 (listing the requirements necessary to cast a
ballot, including the payment of taxes and the ownership of property, in many of the
newly-independent states).
133. WOOD, supra note 131, at 58. Consistent with this belief that an effective political
system did not require the official and systematic representation of certain interests was the
Founders' conviction that "[t]he process of voting was not incidental to representation but
was at the heart of it.").
134. See id. at 221-22 (declaring that the representation of specific interests, such as
property, "violated the homogeneity of interests on which republicanism [is] based"); see also
REID, supra note 123, at 32-33 (remarking that "[t]here may have been no other point of law
about which British and colonial constitutional and political values were so divergent than
the theory that representatives who gave consent to legislation represented property rather
than people.").
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 218-19 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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[The] argument presents itself under a very specious and
seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the
prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when we
come to dissect it with attention it will appear to be made up
of nothing but fair sounding words. The object it seems to aim
at is in the first place impracticable, and in the sense in which
it is contended for is unnecessary ....
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the
people by persons of each class is altogether visionary. Unless
it were expressly provided in the Constitution . . . the thing
would never take place in practice. 36
C. The Administration of the Voting Rights Act and Federalist 10
The Justice Department's administration of the Voting Rights Act
is breeding the very creatures that cause the ailment that James
Madison identified in Federalist 10 as the "disease[] most incident
to Republican Government" - factions. 137 It is true that Madison
identified majority faction as the main source of tumult in
democracies, and that normally only minority factions are
purposefully crafted under the current administration of the Voting
Rights Act.'3 These facts should provide no solace, however,
because the official recognition of minority factions threatens to
allow the majority to realize its strength because it fosters group
consciousness. 139 This recognition is precisely the event that
Madison believed would be avoided by the creation of a large
republic wherein the citizenry would be so widely dispersed that a
majority faction would have extreme difficulty in forming. 140 It is
136. Id.
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
138. See id. at 60 (stating that a minority faction "may clog the administration, it may
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms
of the Constitution."). But see City of Richmond v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523-24
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to Federalist 10 while describing how a
discriminatory program favoring blacks was adopted in Richmond, Virginia, even though
blacks were the majority political group in Richmond).
139. See BURKE, supra note 49, at 32-33 (asserting that the way that the Voting Rights
Act has been administered promotes factions, and that "[r]acial polarization, notably absent
in many districts not covered by the VRA, is routine in majority-minority districts.").
140. FEDERALIST 10, supra note 137, at 64. Madison explained the way a large republic
controls the growth of factions as follows:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with
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certainly ironic that the very government that was created, inter
alia, to control factional conflict is now pursuing a policy that
requires the deliberate creation of factions.
The classical liberal view 'of society espoused by Madison in
Federalist 10, that has as its basis the understanding that the
building blocks of our polity are individuals, is diametrically
opposed to the modem liberal, communitarian view that we are
who we associate with or look like.'4 ' It is for this reason that
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny are important because they signal, at
least indirectly, a possible return to the philosophy behind
Federalist 10 in making redistricting decisions. That is to say that
Shaw v. Reno holds that the government cannot and should not
elevate group concerns, such as the election of minority candidates,
to the predominant position in its ratiocination prior to taking
action on a redistricting plan. 42 Quite frankly, one who analyzes
Federalist 10 is likely to conclude that Madison would have agreed
with the decision in Shaw v. Reno.
D. Race Is Not a Relevant Difference
The logic of the Equal Protection Clause, along with the cases
decided in accordance with it, have firmly established that race is
rarely, if ever, a relevant difference upon which governmental
classifications may be made.lta This conclusion is clearly supported
by the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.1'
In Adarand, the Court held that all governmental
classifications based upon race should be strictly scrutinized to
determine if the Equal Protection Clause has been violated because
distinctions between citizens based upon race can only be justified
by the most extreme circumstances. 145 The fact that elected bodies
are not mirror images of the population at large does not present
each other.
Id.
141. See BURKE, supra note 49, at 25-36 (describing Madison's theory of representation
as "focused on the individual" while communitarian theories are not).
142. See supra Part Bl.A.
143. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
144. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
145. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. Only these extreme circumstances make race relevant.
See Benjamin E. Griffith, Redistricting Litigation in the Next Millennium, 49 CAmT.U. L
REv. 31, 60-61 (1999) (stating "that any race-conscious remedial measure is subject to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause ....
Under strict scrutiny, a racial classification
is required to be justified by a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to
further that interest.").
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such an extreme circumstance.
1. Race Is Not a Relevant Difference: Governmental
Classifications
In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 146 Justice
Blackmun, writing on behalf of only himself, stated that "[i]n order
to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must
treat them differently." 147 In contrast to this declaration, in
Adarand, Justice Scalia remarked in his concurring opinion that
"[t]o pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even for the most
admirable and benign of purposes - is to .. . preserve for future
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery .... In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American."'48
The antinomy created by the clash of these two statements reflects
the question that lies at the heart of every dispute concerning
government action and race - "Is racism the only cure for the
malady of racial prejudice?" In contradistinction to government
policies that discriminate on the basis of race, such as the policy
motivating the current administration of the Voting Rights Act, the
decisions of our nation's highest judicial body do not reflect the
myopic view that the only way to combat racial prejudice is to
adopt racist tactics.
In Hirabayashi v. United States,149 the Supreme Court upheld
government action at the time of the Second World War that
discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry.' 50 While the
specific result in the case suggests that the government is
empowered to discriminate against its citizens according to certain
arbitrary characteristics, the extremely limited nature of the Court's
holding clearly supports the proposition that race, and other such
criteria, are almost always incapable of supporting governmental
classifications.15 1 In fact, the Court circumscribed its approval of
146. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
147. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
148. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
150. Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 102.
151. See id. (explaining that the war-time conditions necessitated that deference be
given to military leaders exercising their war powers and declining to consider whether such
classifications would have been constitutional under other circumstances); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (proclaiming
that racial classifications would be appropriate only in circumstances resembling "social
emergenc[ies]" that endanger "life and limb").
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the classifications by stating that "[b]ecause racial discriminations
are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by
no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress
and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures for
52
our national defense."
The proposition that racial prejudice can and should be remedied
by means other than racist tactics is further supported by the
Court's decision in Anderson v. Martin.15 In Anderson, Justice
Clark, writing for the Court, struck down a Louisiana statute that
mandated that a candidate's race accompany his or her name on
the ballot for all primary, general, or special elections.'5 In
particular, the Court objected to the fact that the statute would
"encourage . . . voters to discriminate upon the grounds of race,"
and would "plac[e] . . . the power of the State behind a racial
classification that includes racial prejudice at the polls."15 Unlike
those who support racial gerrymandering, the Supreme Court in
Anderson found "no relevance in the State's pointing up the race of
the candidate as bearing upon his qualifications for office."'6
The irrelevance of race as a basis for drawing distinctions
between American citizens was further illuminated when the
152. Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 100.
153. 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
154. Anderson, 375 U.S. at 400-02.
155. Id. at 402. Justice Douglas, in Wight v. RockefeUer, 376 U.S. 52, 59 (1964)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), based his dissent upon a similar concern for the lessons that are
taught to citizens through official government action. The dissent is particularly poignant
because the case concerned the constitutionality of a districting plan to which minorities
were not wholly opposed because various majority-minority districts were created. Wright,
376 U.S. at 53-54. After comparing racial gerrymandering to the electoral system constructed
by the British in India to comply with the Indian caste system, Justice Douglas concluded
that:
Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place in a society that honors
the Lincoln tradition - 'of the people, by the people, for the people.' Here the
individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The principle of equality
is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with
the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew,
District D by a Catholic and so on . . . . Of course race, like religion, plays an
important role in the choices which individual voters make from among various
candidates. But government has no business designing electoral districts along racial
or religious lines.
Id. at 66. Finally, in asserting that the plans violated the Constitution even though minority
groups supported the districts, Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe fact that Negro political
leaders find advantage in this nearly solid Negro and Puerto Rican district is irrelevant to
our problem ....

156.

Racial boroughs are ...

Anderson, 375 U.S. at 403.

at war with democratic standards." Id. at 62.
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Supreme Court, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 157 struck
down a program adopted by the city council of Richmond, Virginia,
wherein minority contractors were given preferential treatment in
the award of city construction contracts at the expense of those
who did not belong to the selected group of minorities chosen for
protection by the city council.158 In her opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, Justice O'Connor echoed opinions from past
cases by declaring that the Equal Protection Clause has the same
meaning regardless of the skin color of the citizen who seeks its
protection.159 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor excoriated the
dissenting justices by remarking that blithe acceptance of "benign"
governmental race discrimination will "assure[] that race will
always be relevant in American life."'16 Ultimately, Justice
O'Connor's opinion held that all distinctions based upon race that
are made by states or other political subdivisions must be strictly
scrutinized and can only be justified by a compelling government
interest. 161
Finally, in Adarand, the Supreme Court extended its holding in
157. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
158. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78.
159. Id. at 494 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor quoted Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke wherein Justice Powell stated that "[tihe guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color." Id. at 494 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (plurality opinion)). See supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 495. The continued relevance of race in American society is a fecund source
of hostility and generates an "us against them" racial consciousness. Justice Scalia described
the problem as follows:
Racial preferences appear to "even the score" (in some small degree) only if one
embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into
races, making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be
compensated for by discriminating against a white. Nothing is worth that embrace.
Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 494. The only substantial dissonance between Justice Scalia's opinion and
that of Justice O'Connor resulted from Justice Scalia's refusal to concede that state and local
governments may discriminate on the basis of race to make up for past discrimination. Id. at
520 (Scalia, J., concurring). Continuing to take a position against employing the tactics of
racists to combat the harm that racism has created, Justice Scalia bemoaned the futility of
attempting to confront the effects of racism while contributing to the propagation of its
cause. Id. at 520-21. Specifically, Justice Scalia stated:
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared
with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is
the tendency - fatal to a Nation such as ours - to classify and judge men and women
on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin. A solution to the first
problem that aggravates the second is no solution at all.
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Croson to federal racial discrimination. 162 That is to say that the
Court held that neither the federal government, nor the states, may
discriminate on the basis of race unless the classifications
withstand the strict scrutiny of the judicial branch. 16 Justice
O'Connor, in her opinion for the Court, equated the strict scrutiny
test with relevance and concluded that only distinctions based
upon relevant differences will pass under strict scrutiny.'64
Ultimately, Adarand and Croson, as well as the other cases
referred to in this section, produce a syllogism - because
classifications based upon relevant differences satisfy the strict
scrutiny test, and because very few racial classifications withstand
strict scrutiny, the unavoidable conclusion is that race is rarely, if
ever, a relevant difference upon which governmental distinctions
may be made.
2. Race Is Not a Relevant Difference: Jury Selection
The legal history of the jury selection process in the United
States further solidifies the proposition that the Constitution simply
does not "see" a citizen's race unless patently extreme
circumstances makes race relevant. Indeed, Strauder v. West
Virginia, 65 one of the most salient Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the composition of juries and the right to serve
thereon, established that a pool of prospective jurors may not be
systematically limited according to race.'6 Strauder is important,
162. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
163. Id. The majority opinion identified three guiding principles that courts should
follow in analyzing governmental racial classifications - (1) skepticism, (2) consistency, and
(3) congruence. Id. at 223-24. By skepticism, the Court meant that all distinctions based
upon race must be closely examined; by consistency, the Court meant that the Equal
Protection Clause means the same thing regardless of the race of the complaining party; and
by congruence, the Court meant that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the same protection as does the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
that "there . . . [is] no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race" because "[tihat
concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon the individual ... ."); see also id. at 240
(Thomas, J., concurring) (finding no difference between paternalistic racial discrimination
and that motivated by a desire to oppress a certain race).
164. Id. at 228. Justice O'Connor stated that "strict scrutiny does take 'relevant
differences' into account - indeed, that is its fundamental purpose." Id.
165. 100 U.S. 303 (1879), abrogated, in part, by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537
(1975).
166. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. The decision in Strauder arose from an attempt to
enforce a West Virginia law in the trial of a black man that prohibited blacks from being
considered for jury service. Id. at 305. The holding of the Court was not limited to
discrimination only against black potential jurors as the following passage from the majority
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however, not only for its finding that race is not a relevant
criterion for determining one's eligibility for jury service, but also
for its explicit declaration of what was not found. That is to say
that the Supreme Court in Strauder concluded that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated if
citizens are excluded from the venire because of their race while
expressly distancing itself from any suggestion that the actual
composition of juries must include members of a particular party's
167
racial group.
What the Court did not decide in Strauder it clearly determined
in Virginia v. Rives.168 In Rives the Court was faced with the
petition of two black men who were accused of murdering a white
man in Virginia.' 69 The gravamen of the petition was that the black
defendants had a right to be tried by a jury composed, at least in
part, of members of their own racial group. 170 In rejecting the
claim, Justice Strong's opinion for the Court stated that:
The privilege for which they moved ... was not a right given
or secured to them, or to any person, by the law of the State,
or by any act of Congress, or by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution. It is a right to which every colored man is
entitled, that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life,
liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race,
and no discrimination against them because of their color. But
this is a different thing from the right which it is asserted was
denied to the petitioners by the State court, viz. a right to
have the jury composed in part of colored men. A mixed jury
in a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of

the laws ....

171

opinion indicates: "That the West Virginia statute respecting juries . . . is such a
discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor would it be if the persons excluded by it were
white men." Id. at 308.
167. Id. at 305. The Court stated that:
It is to be observed that the . . . question[] is not whether a colored man, when an
indictment has been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or a petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether,
in the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to indicted or tried, all
persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or
color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.
Id.
168. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
169. Rives, 100 U.S. at 314-15.
170. Id. at 315.
171. Id. at 322-23. See Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906) (stating that "a mixed
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The jury selection process was further cleansed of racial
discrimination by the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v.
Kentucky. 72 The Batson Court was faced with the question of
whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to prevent
certain people from becoming members of a jury violated the Equal
Protection Clause when the peremptory challenges were exercised
on the basis of the potential jurors' race. 73 Because for most, if not
all, trials, peremptory challenges are left to the caprice of trial
lawyers, the Court's consideration of them in Batson was, ipso
facto, significant. 174 Of even more significance, however, was the
Court's determination that premising peremptory challenges upon
the race of the person excluded from jury service violates the
175
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
jury some of which shall be of the same race with the accused, cannot be demanded, as of
right, in any case; nor is a jury of that character guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."); see also Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (remarking that "[flairness in
selection has never been held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury.");
see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (explaining that "we impose no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the
various distinctive groups in the population.").
172. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
173. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. The Batson case originated out of the trial of a black man
for burglary wherein the entire jury was composed of whites. Id. at 82-83. The genesis of the
dispute was the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges to exclude all four black
potential jurors in the venire. Id. at 83.
174. See id. at 89 (explaining that prosecutors customarily have the authority to
exercise their peremptory challenges for any reason imaginable or no reason at all as long as
they believe that their challenges may help them win cases).
175. Id. The Court stated that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
defendant." Id. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause is violated when a person is excluded from serving on a jury because of a
peremptory challenge based upon race).
The Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson v. LeesviUe Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
extended the prohibition on exercising race-based peremptory challenges to civil trials. In
Edmonson, the Court confronted the argument that litigants' ability to determine the
composition of a jury should not be circumscribed because the freedom of litigants to select
the jury generates a degree of acceptance of the jury's verdict. Id. at 630-31. The Court
rejected that argument by stating that:
It may be true that the role of litigants in determining the jury's composition
provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and of its verdicts. But if
race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too
high to meet the standard of the Constitution ....
If our society is to continue to
progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation
of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury. By the
dispassionate analysis which is its special distinction, the law dispels fears and
preconceptions respecting racial attitudes.
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After analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the
jury selection process, it is difficult to imagine what other
conclusion could have been reached in Shaw v. Reno. In fact, such
an analysis leads one to ask the same question that Justice Douglas
pondered in Wright v. Rockefeller 17 6 - "If race is not a proper
criterion for drawing a jury list, how can it be in designing an
electoral district?" 177 The answer, of course, is that race should not
be utilized in either setting. Just as no one has a right to a jury
with any particular racial composition, no one has a right to a
legislature that reflects the racial makeup of society at large. 178 And
just as race is so irrelevant in jury selection that a lawyer may base
a peremptory challenge on the smell of the cologne that a
particular person is wearing but not upon his race, race is also
1 79
irrelevant in the drawing of election districts.
3. Race Is Not a Relevant Difference: Racial Profiling
In addition to the cases discussed herein concerning
classifications based upon race and racial
governmental
discrimination in the jury selection process, the controversy
surrounding racial profiling by law enforcement officers supports
the contention that Shaw v. Reno was correctly decided because
race is almost always irrelevant in the "eyes" of the Constitution.
The typical example of racial profiling occurs when a police officer
decides to stop a young, black, male motorist by conjuring up a
traffic violation for the purpose of searching the motorist for
evidence of other crimes, usually drug possession. 80 This practice,
particularly the treatment of race as a relevant factor in identifying
81
criminals, has been widely condemned.
176. 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964).
177. Wright, 376 U.S. at 67 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See supra note 155.
178. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
180. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual
Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TuL L REV. 1409, 1410-11 (2000)
(stating that "[t]he archetypal example of racial profiling... is an officer's decision to stop a
racial minority, often driving a nice car, for a traffic violation where others committing
similar or greater violations are ignored. Typically, the officer... requests consent from the
motorist to search his car ....").
181. See KG. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
LQ. 89, 127 (1999) (remarking that "[tihe practice, known as racial profiling, has been
repeatedly condemned by minority communities, civil rights leaders and state and federal
legislators. . . ."); see also Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and
Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses
Compared, 63 ALB. L REV. 725, 747 (2000) (declaring that racial profiling has been nearly
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Racial profiling has been rightly identified as an attack on the
dignity of those stopped based upon the color of their skin. 182 It
seems, however, that many of those who oppose racial profiling
believe that skin color is an irrelevant aspect of one's identity while
operating a vehicle, but not when pulling the lever in a voting
booth. Quite frankly, one who espouses such a belief occupies an
untenable position because the irrelevance of race to official
decisionmaking, regardless of statistical support, is recognized in
one instance while ignored in the other. Ultimately, the Equal
Protection Clause demands that both racial profilers and racial
gerrymanderers be universally condemned.
CONCLUSION

The intransigence of the Justice Department, combined with the
requirements of the Constitution as pronounced in Shaw v. Reno,
have left state redistricting committees between Scylla and
Charybdis.'8 3 That is to say that if they attempt to comply with the
Justice Department's majority-minority maximization standard they
will find it nearly impossible to avoid violating the Equal Protection
Clause and its prohibition on the predominant use of race in
drawing voting districts.Is4 Likewise, compliance with the
Constitution will almost always prevent the drawing of enough
majority-minority districts to satisfy the Justice Department and
universally condemned by politicians).
182. See Oliver, supra note 180, at 1435 (explaining that "[ilt is the assault on the
motorist's dignity rather than the invasion on his privacy, or even liberty, that is problematic
when a motorist is singled out because of his race and asked to reveal the contents of his
car.").

183. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1037 (1996) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that "[s]tates may find it extremely difficult to avoid litigation
flowing from decennial redistricting. On one hand, States will risk violating the Voting Rights
Act if they fail to create majority-minority districts. If they create those districts, however,
they may open themselves to liability under Shaw and its progeny.").
184. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 982-83 (refusing to find that the need to comply with section
5 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling government interest because the Justice
Department requires augmentation of minority voting strength rather than non-retrogression);
see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (speculating that even if the requirement
of complying with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling government interest, the Equal
Protection Clause is still violated when preclearance is only granted if minority voting
strength is increased as opposed to not being decreased); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 654 (1993) (stating that "[sitates have a very strong interest in complying with federal
antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and as applied.")
(emphasis added); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (assuming that compliance
with the Voting Rights Act is a compelling government interest, but holding that the Justice
Department's requirements for preclearance prevent redistricting plans from being narrowly
tailored to meet that interest).
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other private litigants.
The Justice Department and the other litigants who wish to
hijack the Voting Rights Act should stand down to avoid the vicious
cycle that inevitably results from the clash of the opposing
camps.8 5 Indeed, those that wish to entrench racial discrimination
into the redistricting process should lobby for a statute that creates
the right for members of some groups to be elected instead of
merely securing the measly right to vote as the Voting Rights Act
does.ls6 Unfortunately, even the passage of such a statute may not
justify the actions of racial gerrymanderers, however, because of
that pesky provision in the Constitution called the Equal Protection
Clause.
In 1778, when our nation was a nascent representative
democracy, there were many who wondered how the debate over
the nature of representation could continue to be so unsettled
"after so much ha[d] been well said, on the worth and importance
of representation, and our blood and treasure lavishly spent to
maintain and preserve it."187 As this article demonstrates, even now,

as our nation sits on the pinnacle of world prestige, the debate
rages on. While the causes of this dissonance are many, the
emphasis on racial differences promulgated by racial
gerrymanderers is irrefragably a prime source of this discord. It is,
in fact, quite remarkable that the philosophy of color blindness was
once espoused by the very ancestors of the racial gerrymanderers
who now condemn it as harmful to certain "rights."a'8 Quite simply,
we must abandon, completely and consistently, the belief that race
is a relevant difference between people to ford the stream of
racism that now divides us. As Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce said,

185. See THERNSTROM, supra note 37, at 486 (identifying the Justice Department, as
opposed to the Voting Rights Act, as the source of redistricting problems); see also HUDSON,
supra note 22, at 1 (explaining that the Voting Rights Act successfully secured the right to
vote to many within the first five years of its existence and was then used for other
unexpected purposes by those with more ambitious desires).
186. See supra note 11 (explaining that the right to vote was recognized in Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964), as an individual right).
187. WOOD, supra note 131, at 185 (quoting the BOSTON CONTINENTAL JOURNAL, Jan. 15,
1778).
188. See BURKE, supra note 49, at 67 (remarking that those who opposed
state-sponsored segregation, such as Thurgood Marshall, were opposed to distinctions based
upon race);

656

Vol. 39:619

Duquesne Law Review

we must "[t]reat all men alike. Give them all the same law. Give
them all an even chance to live and grow ....
The earth is the
mother of all people, and all people should have equal rights upon
it.-18 9
Craig Haller

189.
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322-23 (1996).

